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Union Effects on Performance and Employment Relations:  
Evidence from China 
1. Introduction 
This paper empirically studies the impact of labor union on performance of, and 
employment relations in, China’s private enterprises.  The study is particularly 
valuable because it is about union effect in the context of a set of unique and striking 
institutional features.  As the largest developing economy, China also has the largest 
labor force and the largest union membership in the world.  Economic reform has 
allowed China to achieve a record of thirty years of fast economic growth with new 
employment going mostly into the nonstate sector.  In the process, unions in China 
have acquired the new role of protecting workers’ interests, while continuing their 
traditional role of harmonizing employment relations (more on this shortly).  In such 
a unique context, what are the union effects on the performance of a business and on 
employment relations?  How do these effects compare with those in other economies 
that the literature has amply studied?  These are questions of great academic interest 
and practical importance.  
During the time of central planning, almost all of China’s industrial enterprises 
were state-owned.  Labor union was mandated in these state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and subordinated to the Communist Party with union leaders appointed by the 
Party rather than elected by union members (Ng and Warner, 1998).  With the 
citizens of the country as the ultimate owners of these SOEs, workers’ interest was 
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said to coincide with that of their employers.1  Thus the union was not seen as a 
countervailing force to the employer and not allowed to organize strikes or conduct 
collective bargaining as its counterparts in other parts of the world would do (Metcalf 
and Li, 2006).  Instead, its main function was to help the government to maintain 
social and political stability.2  The union accomplished this function mainly by 
sponsoring social and entertainment activities and by promoting certain welfare 
programs, e.g., short-term financial aid to its members with temporary financial 
difficulties. 
Thirty years of economic reform has witnessed a drastic increase of the share of 
the nonstate sector in China’s economy through privatization of SOEs, massive entry 
of private enterprises and that of multinational companies.  Currently the nonstate 
sector accounts for two thirds of China’s gross domestic products (GDP) and 70 to 80 
percent of its GDP growth (CAI JING, 2007).  Unlike in SOEs, labor union is not 
mandated in nonstate enterprises.  Instead, the employees would have to initiate it.  
With conflicting interests recognized in nonstate employment, unions in China 
acquired the new role of defending workers’ interests, as their counterparts in other 
economies do (White, 1996).  Free election of union leaders has also become a 
common practice in China’s nonstate enterprises.  However, despite all these 
changes, it remains mandatory that all unions in China follow the Party’s rules and 
                                                        
1 The unity of labor’s interest with that of the SOEs as employers is consistent with the 
unitarist view of the employment relation as in Budd and Bhave (2008).  
2 As the founding leader of the former Soviet Union Lenin famously states, one central role 
of unions is to be the transmission belt for delivering the Party’s agenda to the working class 
(e.g., Lucio, 1990). 
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policies.  Under this principle, promoting social harmony remains the highest goal 
for unions across China, as demanded by the Party.3
Given the mixed roles for the union to play these days (i.e., the traditional role of 
promoting harmony and the new role of representing the interests of workers), it is an 
empirical question to what extent have, or have not, unions in China transformed 
themselves, or how effective are they playing their roles (Clarke, 2005).  Specific 
questions include: Do unions in China help the workers to increase their incomes?  If 
yes, in what forms and how significantly do they do it?  Do unions in China affect 
other aspects of employment relations, such as total employment, job security, signing 
of employment contracts, etc?  What implications does unionization have for the 
performance of a business?  As important as they are, to our best knowledge, these 
questions have not been empirically studied.  This paper studies these questions and 
thereby fills a gap in the union literature.  
Our study finds evidence of a positive and statistically significant union effect on 
labor productivity.4  However, there is no evidence of a positive union effect on 
                                                        
3 Mr. Wang Ying, a senior official of the state-backed All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) states: “Our purpose is to guarantee a win-win situation for companies and workers.  
We coordinate labor relations rather than fighting against management” (Ford, 2008). 
Constance Thomas, head of the China Office of the United Nation’s International Labor 
Organization, states: “They (unions in China) will not necessarily be confrontational as in the 
West” (Ford, 2008).   
ACFTU is the only legitimate union organization in China, with branches in all China’s 
regions and major industries.  Unions at individual enterprises must be approved and their 
operations directed by ACFTU branches at regional or industrial levels.   
In Budd and Bhave (2008), an employment relationship is considered pluralistic are 
assumed to have some conflicting interests but also interests in make mutually beneficial 
arrangements between them.  
4 Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest that “what unions do to productivity is one of the key 
factors in assessing the overall economic impact of unions”.  A landmark study by Freeman 
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profitability.5  These findings remain robust when the regression models are 
modified to address typical technical concerns in empirical studies.6  
After the study on productivity and profitability, we further study union effects on 
various aspects of an employment relation, such as wage, benefits, total employment, 
and percentage of workers signing legally binding employment contracts7.  Besides 
their proper importance, findings on these employment variables also shed light on 
possible reasons for the positive union effect on labor productivity.   
It turns out that we find no evidence of a union effect on wages and bonuses, 
which is in contrast to the findings of most previous studies using data of developed 
countries.  However, we do find positive and statistically significant union effects on 
many types of benefits, e.g., medical insurance, pension, unemployment insurance, 
work-related injury insurance, maternity insurance and housing subsidy.  These 
                                                                                                                                                               
and Medoff (1984) finds that unions in general increase productivity.  The effect varies with 
respect to time, place and labor relations environment.  Subsequent studies report mixed 
findings about union effect on productivity.  For good surveys, see Becker and Olson (1987), 
Addison and Hirsch (1989), Belman (1992), Freeman (1992), Booth (1995), Kuhn (1998), 
Hirsch (1997), Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003), Metcalf (2003), 
Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) and Bennett and Kaufman (2007), among others.    
5 In general, when productivity improves, profitability may increase with it, remain 
unchanged or even go down.  The reason is that revenue and profit may both increase with 
productivity, but, without further specification, their relative magnitudes of increases are not 
determined.  Empirically, negative union effect on profitability has been found using data of 
developed countries, e.g., Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
6 To address the possibility of reverse causality, the presence of unions is regressed on 
enterprise performance in the previous year with or without control for a host of other 
variables.  No evidence of reverse causality is found.  The findings on productivity and 
profitability are also robust to the median regression analysis, to the subsample of enterprises 
started as private enterprises as opposed to those privatized from SOEs, and to the subsample 
of enterprises whose majority shareholder has more than 50 percent equity shares.  
7 In China’s private sector, it has been more typical than not that an employer does not sign 
an official employment contract with a worker.  
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findings are consistent with those in the existing literature, although the magnitudes of 
union effects on benefits in China are generally much smaller.   
Besides a positive effect on income (in the forms of benefits), we also find 
statistically significant and positive union effects on other aspects of employment 
relations in an enterprise, i.e., the size of total employment, and the percentage of 
workers signing individual or collective employment contracts with the employer. 
Two conclusions emerge from these findings.  First, unions in China’s private 
enterprises promote workers’ interest, albeit mainly in the form of various 
employment benefits, not wages and bonuses.  Second, while playing the newly 
acquired role of promoting workers’ interests, they seem to maintain their traditional 
role of promoting harmony in employment relations as the union presence has an 
overall positive effect on labor productivity.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the data and 
the variables.  Section 3 reports the findings.  Section 4 summarizes and concludes 
the paper.  
 
 
                                                        
8 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that the increase of labor productivity in 
unionized enterprises could be due to many possible reasons. For example, higher 
productivity could also be explained by greater work effort induced by higher employment 
benefits, as in the logic of agency theory.  Alternatively, enterprises could attract more 
capable workers with higher employment benefits. Note that these explanations are not 
mutually exclusive.  The small union effect on benefits we found, however, suggests likely 
limited effect of effort or ability, and thus a nontrivial impact of employment relations on 
productivity.  Regardless of its explanation, the higher productivity we found suggests that 
unions promote workers’ interests not at the cost of harmony. 
 5
2. Data and Variables 
The dataset used for this study comes from the Private Enterprise Survey in 
China, which was conducted in 2006 jointly by the United Front Work Department of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and 
Commerce Federation, and the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences.9  The Survey used the multi-stage stratified random 
sampling method to achieve a balanced representation across all regions and 
industries.  It first determined the total number of private enterprises to be surveyed.  
Afterwards, it selected two cities from each of the thirty-one province-level regions 
(i.e., the 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities and 5 minority autonomous 
regions), which included the capital city of each region or one prefecture-level city, 
and one county-level city.  The number of private enterprises to be surveyed in each 
region is calculated as the product of the region's share of private enterprises in the 
national total with the total number of private enterprises in the survey.  The same 
method is used to determine the number of enterprises in each city or industry.  
Finally, private enterprises are randomly chosen from each sub-sample.  The initial 
sample size is 3,837 enterprises.  
Our data set has information on enterprise operation and performance, such as 
employment, output, profits, fixed asset, etc.  Two dependent variables are used to 
                                                        
9 This dataset has been used by others, e.g., Bai, Lu, and Tao (2006) in a study of private 
enterprises’ access to bank loans; Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou (2008) in a study of 
entrepreneurial party membership and enterprise performance; and Du, Lu, and Tao (2008) in 
a study examining the impact of property rights protection on enterprise diversification. 
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study enterprise performance: Labor Productivity (the logarithm of output divided by 
total employment) and Profitability (profits divided by total fixed assets).  The key 
explanatory variable used in the study is the presence of a union.  In the Survey, 
there is a question asking whether or not an enterprise has a union.  Of the 3,837 
enterprises surveyed, 3,239 answered this question.  A dummy variable called Union 
is constructed, taking value one if the answer is affirmative and zero otherwise.  
53.29 percent of those enterprises who answered the question have unions.  
Summary statistics are given in Table 1.   
To alleviate the concern of omitted variables, we include a host of variables that 
may affect an enterprise’s performance.  The background and capability of 
entrepreneurs can be important determinants of private enterprise performance.  
Therefore, we include some conventional managerial human capital variables like Age 
(the age of the entrepreneur by the end of 2005), Education (years of formal schooling) 
and Managerial Experiences (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur 
had had a managerial position before s/he started his or her own business or zero 
otherwise) and some political participation variables such as Party Membership (a 
dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur is a member of Chinese 
Communist Party or zero otherwise), Government Cadre (a dummy variable taking 
value one if the entrepreneur used to be a government official or zero otherwise), CPC 
Membership (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur is a member of 
the Chinese People's Congress or zero otherwise), and CPPCC Membership (a 
dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur is a member of the Chinese 
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People's Political Consultative Conference or zero otherwise).10  We also control for 
enterprise characteristics, such as Enterprise Size (the logarithm of the number of 
employees in each enterprise) and Enterprise Age (the logarithm of the number of 
years an enterprise was established by the end of 2005).  Finally, industrial and 
regional dummies are included to control for industry- and region-specific factors 
affecting performance.  
In the study of the union effects on employment relations in China’s private 
enterprises, the following dependent variables are regressed on whether or not a union 
exists: Wages and Bonuses (total wages and bonuses divided by total employment), 
Medical Insurance (measured by the percentage of employees having medical 
insurance), Pension (measured by the percentage of employees having pension), 
Unemployment Insurance (measured by the percentage of employees having 
unemployment insurance), Work-related Injury Insurance (measured by the 
percentage of employees having work-related injury insurance), Maternity Insurance 
(measured by the percentage of employees having maternity insurance), and Housing 
Subsidy (a dummy variable taking value one if the enterprise offers housing subsidy 
and zero otherwise), Employment (measured by the logarithm of the number of 
employees by the end of 2005), Individual Contract (measured by the percentage of 
                                                        
10 The Chinese People's Congress (CPC) is the highest organ of state power in China, while 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is the advisory organ to the 
Chinese People's Congress and the government.  A person can have memberships in both 
CPC and CPPCC.  Party membership is not a necessary condition for either CPC or CPPCC 
membership. 71.5 percent of the ninth CPC members (elected in 1998) were members of the 
Communist Party, whereas only 4.4 percent of the 10th CPPCC members (elected in 2003) 
were members of the Communist Party.  
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employees having individual contracts with the employer), and Collective Contract 
(measured by the percentage of employees having collective contracts with the 
employer).  Besides the great importance in its own sake, finding out about union 
effects on these key employment variables can shed light on reasons for the positive 
union effect on labor productivity reported in Section 3.1. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Union Effects on Performance 
The regression model used to study the union effects on enterprise performance is 
as follows: 
                              (1) eireir Xy εγβα ++•+= 'eireir Union
where is the measure of performance (i.e., Labor Productivity or Profitability) for 
enterprise e in industry i in region
eiry
r , is a set of control variables including 
entrepreneurial characteristics, enterprise characteristics, and industrial and regional 
dummies. Standard error is clustered at the region-level, allowing arbitrary correlation 
within the region.  
eirX
Ordinary-least-squares regression results are reported in Table 2, in which Labor 
Productivity and Profitability are the dependent variables for, respectively, columns 1 
and 2.  It is found that unions have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
labor productivity, but not a significant impact on profitability.  Specifically, having 
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a union is associated with a 0.079-standard-deviation increase in labor productivity.11  
To alleviate the concern of omitted variables, we add a host of variables reflecting 
industrial, regional, enterprise and entrepreneurial characteristics as defined earlier in 
section 2.  To save space, from hereon, we report only results for Labor Productivity 
as the dependent variable.12  Regression results are reported in Columns 3-6 of Table 
2.  It is clear from these results that the positive union effect on labor productivity 
we found earlier remains robust to these controls.   
The coefficients of the control variables are also interesting and meaningful. 
Results reported in columns 3-4 of Table 3 show that both industrial affiliation and 
regional characteristics have statistically significant impact on labor productivity.  
Those reported in column 5 show that smaller and older enterprises exhibit higher 
labor productivity.  Finally, those reported in column 6 show that an entrepreneur’s 
education and managerial experience contribute positively to labor productivity.   
To address the potential concern of reverse causality, a regression of Union on 
labor productivity in the previous year is run.  Probit regression results with a set of 
control variables are reported in Column 1 of Table 3.  These results make clear that 
labor productivity in the previous year does not have any significant impact on the 
                                                        
11 0.079 is obtained by dividing the estimated coefficient (0.201) by the standard deviation of 
labor productivity (1.497).  In general, higher productivity does not necessarily imply 
higher profitability, as higher productivity leads to both higher revenue and higher 
total profit.  It is thus possible to find no significant union effect on profitability 
despite the positive union effect on productivity.  In our study, positive union effect 
on profit is found when firm size is not controlled (results available upon request).  
When firm size is controlled for, union effect on profit is essentially similar to union 
effect on profitability, hence the ambiguous result.  
12 Results for Profitability as the performance measure are available upon request.  They are 
similar to those reported in column 2 of Table 2 and are not statistically significant.  
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presence of a union in an enterprise, suggesting that the concern for reverse causality 
is not a major one in our case.  
To further alleviate the concern of endogeneity (i.e., omitted variables bias and 
reverse causality), we use the instrumental variable estimation.  Specifically, we use 
Party Membership, Government Cadre, CPC Membership, and CPPCC Membership 
as the instruments for the union presence.  The instrumental variable estimation 
results are reported in Column 2 of Table 3. It is found that the presence of a union 
still casts a positive and statistically significant effect on labor productivity.  
Meanwhile, the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic confirms that our 
instrumental variables are relevant, while the Hansen J statistic shows that our 
instrumental variables are valid.  
Three robustness checks are further conducted.  First, in Column 1 of Table 4, 
the median regression, which is less sensitive to outliers, is done.  It confirms the 
robustness of the earlier results.  Second, some of China's private enterprises were 
privatized from SOEs, where a union is mandated.  To address the potential concern 
that the presence of a union is the legacy of an SOE, the analyses are repeated using 
the subsample of the enterprises that started as private enterprises.  As summarized 
in column 2 of Table 4, all the results remained robust.  Finally, the analyses are 
repeated using the subsample of the enterprises whose majority shareholder has more 
than 50% equity shares.  Results reported in column 3 of Table 4 show that our main 
results also remain robust to this subsample. 
The message from Tables 2 through 4 is clear: unions in China’s private 
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enterprises have a positive and statistically significant impact on labor productivity, 
but not on profitability.  These findings are in sharp contrast to the mixed findings of 
union effect on productivity reported in the literature using the data of developed 
economies (Hirsch, 2004a).  
3.2. Union Effects on Employment Relations 
In this subsection, we study union effects on employment relation, focusing on a 
set of variables on employment relation as listed in section 2: wages and bonuses, 
non-wage benefits, size of workforce employed, and signing of legally binding 
contracts.  As explained in section 2, all the regressions control for the same set of 
variables used earlier, e.g., those representing industry, region, enterprise and 
entrepreneurial characteristics.  To save space, the results with regard to these 
control variables are not reported, but available upon request.   
Regression results are reported in Tables 5-6.  Column 1 of Table 5 reports union 
effect on wages and bonuses per employee.  It is found that the employees in the 
unionized enterprises do not have higher wages and bonuses compared to their 
counterparts in non-unionized enterprises.  This is in sharp contrast to the findings 
reported in the literature.13   
Columns 2-7 of Table 5 examines the union effects on various types of workers’ 
non-wage benefits, such as medical insurance, pension, unemployment insurance, 
                                                        
13 For example, using US data, Lewis (1963, 1986) finds an average 15 percent wage gap in 
union and nonunion employments.  Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba (1998) find the mean and 
median responses from professional economists regarding union-nonunion wage gap are 15 
percent and 13.1 percent, respectively.  For a recent survey of union effect on wage, see 
Hirsch (2004b).   
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work-related injury insurance, maternity insurance, and housing subsidy.14  It is 
found that Union has positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients along 
all these types of benefits, generally in line with the results found by other authors, 
e.g., Freeman and Medoff (1979, 1984), Freeman (1981, 1984, 1985).  
Specifically, we find that 10.3 percent more employees are offered medical 
insurance in unionized as compared to those in nonunionized enterprises.  This is 
consistent with the findings of positive union effect on medical insurance in the 
existing literature, e.g., Wunnava and Ewing (1999) who report a 10 percent union 
effect on medical insurance using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 
and Budd (2004) who finds a 20 percent premium of union effect on health insurance 
using the U.S. Current Population Survey.  See also Fosu (1993) and Buchmueller, 
DiNardo, and Valletta (2002), among others. 
It is also found that 12.4 percent more employees are provided pension in 
unionized than in nonunionized enterprises.  This finding is, again, consistent with 
those in the existing literature.  For example, Allen and Clark (1986) report that 
unionized individuals are 50 to 100 percent more likely to receive pension than 
nonunionized individuals using the US Department of Labor data.  Renaud (1998) 
finds that in Canada the union premium on pension is around 20 percent.  See also 
                                                        
14 According to China’s regulations on labor employment, enterprises and employees jointly 
contribute to the employment benefits.  Specifically, an enterprise needs to pay 20% of its 
employee’s monthly wage for his pension, 8% for the medical benefits, 1.5% for the 
unemployment insurance, 1% for the work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance, 
and 10% for the housing subsidy.  In the meanwhile, the employee needs to pay 8% of his 
monthly wage for the pension, 2% for the medical benefits, 0.5% for the unemployment 
insurance, 0.8% for the work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance, and 10% for 
the housing subsidy. 
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Freeman (1984, 1985), Swidinsky and Kupferschmidt (1991), Fosu (1993), Kornfeld 
(1993), Montgomery and Shaw (1997), and Budd (2004), among others.  
The unionized workers are also found to be 9.5 percent, 11.8 percent, 7.5 percent 
and 3.8 percent more likely to receive unemployment insurance, work-related injury 
insurance, maternity insurance, and housing subsidy, respectively.  Using data of the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Budd and McCall (1997, 2004) find that 
unionization increases unemployment insurance by 23%.  However, Guthrie and 
Roth (1999) and Kelly and Dobbin (1999) found no statistically significant impacts of 
unions on maternity leave programs in U.S. organizations.  As some of these benefits, 
such as housing subsidy, are unique to the setting of China, they have not been 
extensively studied in the existing literature, and hence our estimation represents one 
of the first few studies on the union premium on these non-wage benefits.  
Table 6 reports the regression results of the union effects on several other aspects 
of employment relations.  As shown in column 1, unionized enterprises have larger 
total employment than their nonunionized counterparts.  This finding is in contrast to 
the zero or small negative union effect on employment found in the private sector in 
the US, e.g., by Montgomery (1989).  Columns 2 and 3 report that employers in 
unionized enterprises are more likely to sign formal employment contracts with their 
employees, both individually and collectively.15     
                                                        
15 As mentioned earlier, against the law, employers in China often chose not to sign 
employment contracts with their workers.   
 14
4. Summary and concluding remarks 
The role of union in China as the largest transitional economy with the largest 
union membership has changed.  Before the economic reform was initiated in 1978, 
union was mandated in China’s SOEs and subordinate to the ruling Party.  Its main 
charge was to help the government maintain harmony in employment relations.  In 
the process of three decades of economic reform, the nonstate sector has emerged and 
become dominant in the economy.  In the new nonstate sector, labor union is no 
longer mandatory and has some new roles to play when it exists.  With conflicting 
interests between workers and their employers more pronounced in the nonstate sector, 
unions need to do more to promote workers’ interests than it traditionally did in China.  
At the same time, harmonizing employment relations remains a primary responsibility 
and objective of the unions, as required by the Party.  We have endeavored to study 
how effective unions in China’s private enterprises are playing their mixed roles.   
Our study finds a positive and statistically significant union effect on labor 
productivity, but not on profitability.  The results are robust to the control of omitted 
variables and reverse causality issue.   
The study also finds that, although unions do not directly contribute to positive 
wage gains for the workers, they do contribute to better employee benefits, increased 
signing of formal employment contracts, and hence more harmonious employment 
relations in China’s private enterprises.  The performance findings suggest that 
workers’ interests are promoted not at the cost of harmony in employment relations.   
The study contributes to the literature by being one of the first to study unions in 
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the largest transitional and fastest growing economy in the past thirty years.  It filled 
some gaps in the literature and enriched our understanding of unions.   
Our findings may shed light on why some of the largest MNCs seem much more 
receptive to unions in their operations in China than at home or in other parts of the 
world.  A highly publicized case is Wal-Mart.  Deviating from its long standing 
anti-union position, Wal-Mart officially announced in 2004 that “should associates 
request formation of a union, Wal-Mart China would respect their wish.”16  Five out 
of Wal-Mart’s 59 stores in China established unions shortly after the company 
announced this new policy.  Wal-Mart is not alone.  Almost all Fortune 500 
companies now allow unions in their operations in China (Ford, 2008).  It is quite 
possible that such receptive policies towards unionization involve multiple 
considerations.  For example, it could be a public relations effort and/or yielding to 
outside pressure from, e.g., the government.  However, Meyerson (2004) believes 
that Wal-Mart’s policy signals its preference for old-line communist-dominated labor 
unions to other kinds of unions.  By demonstrating that unions in China’s private 
enterprises tend to promote workers’ interests and performance at the same time, our 
study suggests it is worthwhile to explore internal-based rationales for Wal-Mart’s and 
other MNCs’ receptive union policies as conjectured by Meyerson (2004).   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 Wal-Mart refers to its workers as associates. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Union      3,239 0.533 0.499 0 1
Enterprise Performance    
Labor Productivity      3,035 2.538 1.497 -4.094 10.304
Profitability      2,192 0.456 6.197 -99.7 252.826
Labor Productivity in the Previous year 2,623 1.671 1.619 -4.564 7.234
Employment Relations   
Wages and Bonuses      3,172 1.619 11.036 0.003 611.111
Medical Insurance      2,490 0.266 0.362 0 1
Pension      2,589 0.296 0.359 0 1
Unemployment Insurance      2,330 0.185 0.328 0 1
Work-related Injury Insurance      2,408 0.257 0.373 0 1
Maternity Insurance      2,242 0.107 0.259 0 1
Housing Subsidy      2,354 0.076 0.264 0 1
Employment      3,573 3.853 1.575 0 9.350
Individual Contract      2,984 0.709 0.367 0 1
Group Contract      1,790 0.244 0.392 0 1
Enterprise Characteristics    
Enterprise Size      3,573 3.853 1.575 0 9.350
Enterprise Age      3,689 1.926 0.587 0.693 3.091
Entrepreneurial Characteristics    
Age      3,807 45.403 8.336 18 81
Education      3,814 13.304 2.705 5 19
Managerial Experience      2,400 0.355 0.479 0 1
Party Membership      3,445 0.405 0.491 0 1
Government Cadre      3,836 0.178 0.383 0 1
CPC Membership      3,836 0.190 0.393 0 1
CPPCC Membership      3,836 0.262 0.440 0 1
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity Profitability Labor Productivity 
Union 0.201*** -0.026 0.258*** 0.222*** 0.391*** 0.429*** 
 (0.056) (0.359) (0.062) (0.068) (0.076) (0.097) 
F-statistic for Industrial Dummies   [122.61]*** [165.22]*** [98.39]*** [164.80]*** 
F-statistic for Regional Dummies    [76185.00]*** [2304.14]*** [12903.52]*** 
Enterprise Characteristics       
Enterprise Size     -0.200*** -0.247*** 
     (0.034) (0.038) 
Enterprise Age     0.178** 0.188** 
     (0.075) (0.081) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics       
Age      0.004 
      (0.005) 
Education      0.094*** 
      (0.015) 
Managerial Experience      0.266** 
      (0.100) 
Party Membership      0.115 
      (0.089) 
Government Cadre      -0.003 
      (0.110) 
CPC Membership      0.148 
      (0.105) 
CPPCC Membership      0.028 
      (0.111) 
No of Observations 2,628 1,932 2,628 2,628 2,556 1,521 
R-squared 0.0045 0.0000 0.0611 0.1127 0.1404 0.1963 
p-value for F-statistic 0.0012 0.9434 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard error, clustered at the region-level, is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Table 2: Union effects on performance 
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Table 3: Union effects on performance, reverse causality and endogeneity 
 
 1 2 
Dependent Variable Union Labor Productivity 
Estimation Specification Probit IV 
Labor Productivity in the previous year 0.010  
 (0.026)  
Union  1.445*** 
  (0.492) 
F-statistic for Industrial Dummies [55.58]*** [102.69]*** 
F-statistic for Regional Dummies [3.7e+05]*** [109.58]*** 
Enterprise Characteristics   
Enterprise Size 0.352*** -0.346*** 
 (0.033) (0.064) 
Enterprise Age 0.176* 0.101 
 (0.093) (0.091) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics   
Age 0.009 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Education 0.033 0.089*** 
 (0.025) (0.017) 
Managerial Experience -0.044 0.263*** 
 (0.088) (0.0798) 
Party Membership 0.343***  
 (0.117)  
Government Cadre -0.265**  
 (0.126)  
CPC Membership 0.330***  
 (0.100)  
CPPCC Membership 0.139  
 (0.104)  
First Stage Results   
Party Membership  0.115*** 
  (0.025) 
Government Cadre  -0.052 
  (0.035) 
CPC Membership  0.081*** 
  (0.027) 
CPPCC Membership  0.085*** 
  (0.026) 
Shea Partial R-squared  0.0270 
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic  [41.66]*** 
Hansen J Statistic  [1.269] 
No of Observations 1,308 1,521 
Pseudo R2 0.2324 - 
Standard error, clustered at the region-level, is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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Table 4: Union effects on performance, robustness checks 
 
 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity 
Estimation Specification Median Regression
Private 
Firms from 
Scratch 
Private Firms 
Majorly-owned 
by the 
Entrepreneurs
Union 0.291*** 0.198** 0.350*** 
 (0.057) (0.097) (0.110) 
F-statistic for Industrial Dummies [17.96]*** [356.69]*** [175.30]*** 
F-statistic for Regional Dummies [9.35]*** [3311.80]*** [96126.53]***
Enterprise Characteristics    
Enterprise Size -0.190*** -0.227*** -0.258*** 
 (0.021) (0.052) (0.054) 
Enterprise Age 0.181*** 0.209** 0.199* 
 (0.048) (0.089) (0.103) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics    
Age 0.006 0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Education 0.102*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) 
Managerial Experience 0.191*** 0.184 0.222* 
 (0.055) (0.109) (0.121) 
Party Membership 0.053 0.141 0.132 
 (0.055) (0.104) (0.112) 
Government Cadre -0.036 0.148 0.183 
 (0.072) (0.127) (0.137) 
CPC Membership 0.285*** 0.104 0.219** 
 (0.061) (0.140) (0.105) 
CPPCC Membership -0.078 0.024 0.080 
 (0.059) (0.134) (0.154) 
No of Observations 1,521 1,049 992 
R-squared/Pseudo R2 0.1227 0.1968 0.2203 
Standard error, clustered at the region-level, is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. In Column 2 we use the subsample of the enterprises 
that started as private enterprises, while in Column 3 we use the subsample of the enterprises whose 
majority shareholder has more than 50% equity shares 
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 Table 5: Union effects on employment relations, wages and benefits 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent Variable Wages and Bonuses Medical Insurance Pension Unemployment Insurance 
Work-related Injury 
Insurance Maternity Insurance Housing Subsidy 
Estimation Specification  OLS  Probit  
Union -0.081 0.103*** 0.124*** 0.095*** 0.118*** 0.075*** 0.548*** 
  (0.551) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.031) (0.025) (0.141) 
Industrial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enterprise Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Observations 1,550 1,270 1,325 1,217 1,251 1,159 1,054 
R-squared/Pseudo R2 0.0332 0.1510 0.2099 0.1791 0.1442 0.1645 0.1984 
Standard error, clustered at the region-level, is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  Wages and Bonuses is 
constructed as the total wages and bonuses divided by total employment, Medical Insurance is measured by the percentage of employees having medical insurance, Pension 
is measured by the percentage of employees having pension, Unemployment Insurance is measured by the percentage of employees having unemployment insurance, 
Work-related Injury Insurance is measured by the percentage of employees having work-related injury insurance, Maternity Insurance is measured by the percentage of 
employees having maternity insurance, and Housing Subsidy is a dummy variable taking value one if the enterprise offers housing subsidy and zero otherwise.  
 
Table 6: Union effects on employment relations, employment and contract 
 
  1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Employment Individual Contract Group Contract 
Estimation Specification  OLS  
Union 0.763*** 0.119** 0.188* 
  (0.070) (0.014) (0.051) 
Industrial Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Enterprise Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
No of Observations 1,727 1,482 942 
Pseudo R2 0.4470 0.1047 0.2217 
Standard error, clustered at the region-level, is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  Employment is measured by the logarithm of the 
number of employees by the end of 2005, Individual Contract is measured by the percentage of 
employees having individual contracts with the employer, and Collective Contract is measured by the 
percentage of employees having collective contracts with the employer.  
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